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RESPONSE TO COMMENTS
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER. JR.

Thank you. The hour is late. My remarks will be brief. I would
incorporate everything that Professor Kurland and Professor
Greene said by reference.
As to Professor Ceaser, I greatly enjoyed his polemical attack
on polemics. I'm not sure that I altogether understood his argument at all times. But if he said-as I gathered him to say-that the
Executive has the right to act, in certain circumstances, contrary to
congressional will, I'm not sure that he really meant that. I can only
recommend to him that, following the example of Professor Greene,
he re-read Justice Jackson's concurrence in the Youngstown case
where Jackson describes the various levels at which independent
Presidential power should be exercised.' Exercise in defiance of
congressional statute is, of course, the level at which the President's
power is weakest.
I found more of substance in Mr. Cooper's paper. Mr. Cooper
is obviously a good advocate, and, like all good advocates, he tends
to overstate his case. I don't know where he got the idea that I am
in favor of effectively abolishing the Presidency, or, at least, of abolishing Presidential power or leadership in foreign affairs. I've always been in favor of a strong Presidency-a strong Presidency
within the Constitution.
The argument of my paper was an argument for Presidential
leadership, not an argument against it. If we had truly effective
Presidential leadership, we wouldn't have to sneak behind the Constitution and sneak behind the laws, as the current President has
been doing.
As to the question of the Intelligence Finding, Mr. Cooper is
quite right that the Intelligence Finding was an attempt, through the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment and later the Intelligence Oversight Act,
to plug a hole in the system. What the Intelligence Oversight Act,
by way of the Intelligence Finding, seeks to do is to outlaw the concept of "plausible deniability." The discussion, the other day, by
that great constitutional expert Admiral Poindexter on "plausible
deniability" was completely oblivious to the fact that "plausible
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-60 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
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deniability" has been outlawed by the Hughes-Ryan Amendment
and by the Intelligence Oversight Act. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment may not specifically require that findings be reduced to writing, but the Intelligence Oversight Act states that "a report to the
Congress, concerning any finding or determination under any section of this chapter ...shall be reduced to writing and signed by the
2
President."
The question of prior notice was not an issue, because the January 17, 1986, Intelligence Finding was retroactive, justifying actions
that had already been undertaken. We would not know about them
until today had it not been for the fact that everyone in the Middle
East knew about them, and, finally, someone published these activities in a newspaper. That is not what Congress meant when it said
timely notification.
Really, I think the defenders of President Reagan should stop
invoking the Curtiss-Wrightcase.3 The issue decided in Curtiss-Wright
had absolutely nothing to do with the justification of secret, unilateral Presidential action in defiance of congressional statutes.
Rather, what the Curtiss-Wright case decided was the President's
power to act, to apply, and to effectuate a resolution passed by Congress. That was the question upon which the Curtiss-Wright case
turned. As Justice Jackson later put it, Curtiss-Wright "involved, not
the question of the President's power to act without congressional
authority, but the question of his right to act under and in accord
with an Act of Congress." 4
The case had absolutely nothing to do with any of the things
that Reagan has been doing. The fact that Justice Sutherland threw
in a few obiter dicta is irrelevant to anything decided by the case. Nor
did these obiter dicta say anything that would vindicate the kind of
secret sneaking behind the Constitution and laws that has been revealed in the last few days.
The Constitution states that the President shall take care that
the laws be faithfully executed. Well, if Mr. Cooper thinks that President Reagan has taken care that the laws be faithfully executed, I
rather doubt that the men who framed the Constitution two hundred years ago would agree.
Thank you.
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22 U.S.C. § 2414(a) (1982). But see Cooper, Comment 47 MD. L. REV. 84, 87-88
(questioning Professor Schlesinger's invocation of this statute).
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 635-36 n.2.

